












Philosophy of perception is in very good shape: it is an increasingly central discipline within philosophy and it is at the forefront of combining empirical findings with age-old philosophical questions. But philosophy of perception is also in pretty bad shape: there is plenty of miscommunication and even philosophers in very similar subfields within philosophy of perception often talk past each other (none of that of course in this volume). So it may be useful to have a roadmap that at least attempts to relate the different approaches to the philosophical study of perception to one another. 
This road map, just like the volume itself, is of course partial. Others would have picked six different current controversies in philosophy of perception. The six I picked to some degree reflect my own philosophical taste and also my own sociological assessment of what is generally taken to be important in this field in 2016. The reference to bypass roads is more than a pun. I will not give in-depth analyses of the oeuvres of any of the major contributors to contemporary philosophy of perception. Many of these major contributors say what they have to say in the chapters to follow. Rather than honing in on individual philosophers of perception, I want to spot trends, track down shared assumptions and explore where some new research directions are leading. The result is, no doubt, very broad brushstroke and sometimes oversimplified, but the hope is that I can at least avoid congestions this way. 

I. Perceptual processing versus perceptual phenomenology

Different philosophers are interested in perception for different reasons. And they often even mean different things by ‘perception’. 
Some philosophers are interested in perceptual processing. Not just philosophers, also psychologists and cognitive scientists. The general picture is that when you look out of the window and see that it is raining outside, this all starts with light hitting your retina. Light hitting your retina is the sensory stimulation. But light hitting your retina is not perception yet. Nonetheless, it gets the ball rolling. And then lots of complicated things happen in your brain and at the end of that you may end up forming a belief that it is raining outside or maybe performing a perceptually guided action (which could happen without the involvement of beliefs, in the case of dorsal vision, for example, a topic I will return to in Section II). So perceptual processing takes us from the sensory stimulation to some various ways in which our cognitive system uses perceptual information – to belief formation, to perceptually guided action, and so on. 
Some other philosophers, not so much psychologists or cognitive scientists, when they say they are interested in perception, what they mean by this is that they are interested in perceptual experience or perceptual phenomenology. They are interested in what it is like to perceive. They are not particularly bothered about what brain mechanisms bring about this experience – they are interested in various features of this experience itself (say, its alleged transparency) or maybe its various epistemological implications. 
If you are interested in perception as perceptual processing, you are likely to be interested in perception per se, whether or not it is conscious. Consciousness, as well as the distinction between conscious and unconscious perception is likely to be of secondary importance. In contrast, if you are interested in perception as perceptual phenomenology, then it’s all about conscious perception. Unconscious perception is at best of secondary importance, which may serve as a tool for understanding perceptual phenomenology – or else it is dismissed altogether as a degenerate form of perception (or maybe even demoted to ‘mere’ information processing). 
If you are interested in perception as perceptual processing, you have a lot to learn from the empirical sciences: they can really do a lot to explain what happens with the sensory stimulation during various phases of perceptual processing and how it may interact with higher-level mental states like beliefs. (This doesn’t mean that the perception as perceptual processing approach has to give a neuroscientific characterization of perceptual processing – in fact most often this characterization is functional, not anatomical.) If you are interested in perception as perceptual phenomenology, the empirical sciences will be less directly relevant. From the point of view of ‘what it is like to perceive’, it may be helpful to understand what happens in the primary visual cortex, but this is at best considered as a data point that bears a fairly indirect relation to the real explanandum: perceptual phenomenology. 
In an ideal world, of course, these two approaches would go hand in hand. The dream is to understand what kind of perceptual processing leads to what kind of perceptual experience. And very many empirical findings very actively use the subjective reports of subjects as data points (not as conclusive evidence, but as data points). Many philosophers of perception (and almost all contributors to this volume) are explicitly (or less explicitly) trying to bring together these two ways of approaching perception. But the two approaches can and do often come apart and this can lead to serious misunderstandings that divide the field of philosophy of perception considerably. 
It is easy to caricature both of these approaches. One can dismiss the perception as perceptual processing approach as not philosophy. If you are so interested in the interaction between the primary visual cortex and V4, go and change majors and do cognitive neuroscience, not philosophy. Philosophy is about the grand eternal questions and the minor details of contingent facts about perceptual processing are neither grand, nor eternal. 
And one can also dismiss the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach as mere intuition mongering. If we are looking at the same scene and you report perceptual phenomenology of a certain kind and I report another kind, how can we decide who is right and who is wrong? The methodology of addressing such questions would need to rely on introspection and introspection is fabulously unreliable. 
Again, the aim is to resist the temptation to give a caricature version of either approach and to take both of them seriously. I suspect that all philosophers of perception find one of the two approaches easier to relate to than the other one. I certainly do. But the goal should be to take whatever route we can to understand the complex phenomenon that is perception. And making a distinction between the two very different explananda (perceptual phenomenology and perceptual processing) could be the first step towards clearing up some confusions and misunderstandings.
Which big picture view one has about perception, processing or phenomenology, has an impact on some of the major controversies in philosophy of perception. The clearest case of this is probably the most influential contemporary debate in philosophy of perception, the debate about whether perceptual states are representations (see the papers in Brogaard 2014). 

II. Perceptual representation versus perceptual relation

Representationalists say that perceptual states are representations: they represent individuals as having properties (see Siegel 2010a, 2010b, Pautz 2010, Tye 2007, Crane 2006, Burge 2005, Peacocke 1989, Schellenberg 2010 for very different versions of representationalism). When I look out of the window, I see dark clouds. I perceptually represent the clouds as having the property of being dark. Things may go wrong, of course; I may have an eye condition that makes me see dark clouds, whereas the clouds are in fact very light. In this case, my perceptual state misrepresents. If I see dark clouds and the clouds are in fact dark, my perceptual state represents correctly. Just what kind of representations these perceptual states are is something I will return to in Section III and IV. 
Not all philosophers of perception are representationalists. Some are relationalists (or ‘naïve realists’): they claim that perceptual states are not representations (or, sometimes more modestly, not primarily representations or not essentially representations, see Campbell 2002, Martin 2004, 2006, Travis 2004, Brewer 2006, 2011 for very different versions of relationalism). Perceptual states do not represent the perceived object. Rather, they have the perceived object as one of their actual constitutive parts. Or, to put it differently, relationalists claim that perceptual states are relations between the subject and the perceived object (and maybe some third relatum labeled as ‘the third relatum’ (Brewer 2011, Campbell 2002)). So the perceived object is not something that may or may not be present when you perceive (as some representationalists would say). It has to be there for your perceptual state to be a perceptual state. 
One implication of this view is that hallucinations are, at least on one straightforward way of understanding hallucinations (see Byrne and Logue 2008 for a nuanced analysis), not perceptual states: their object is missing – so they cannot be a constitutive part of the perceptual state. Many relationalists are happy to bite this bullet: hallucinations may feel like perceptual states, but they are not – they are in fact radically different: perceptual states are relations to something actual, whereas hallucinations are something different – whatever hallucinations are, they are by definition not relations to something actual. 
Relationalism is very much formulated within the framework of the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach. Many of the motivations for this view allude explicitly to phenomenology, for example (see, e.g., Martin 2002, 2004, 2006, Brewer 2011). And this is something most proponents of relationalism would be very happy to acknowledge. So all the claims about perceptual states I attributed to the relationalist are really claims about conscious perceptual experiences. But then what can relationalists say about unconscious perception? 
Relationalists have, on the face of it, three options. First, they can deny that there is such a thing as unconscious perception or at least question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit unconscious perception. This is what Ian Phillips does in this volume (although he has never endorsed relationalism in print). The strategy would be to show that all alleged examples of unconscious perception are either not perception or not unconscious. And then the debate between relationalists and representationalists would be fought about the details of the perceptual processing (and of some experimental findings about them) – as the contribution by Ian Phillips and Ned Block in this volume shows nicely. I am very sympathetic to this way of steering the representationalism versus relationalism debate towards a closer engagement with details of perceptual processing. 
The second option for the relationalist would be to allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to those. Perceptual experiences are relations to token objects, but unconscious perceptual states are not. Some of them would even be happy to allow for perceptual representations when it comes to unconscious perceptual representations. But this strategy makes one wonder how much conscious and unconscious perception have in common (presumably not a lot, see McDowell 1994, who is by no means a textbook relationalist). 
Finally, the third option for relationalists would be to allow for unconscious perception and extend the relationalist analysis to unconscious perceptual states. But I am not sure how this would work: if we allow for unconscious perceptual states, we face some disturbing empirical findings about them, namely, that often we have a conscious and an unconscious perceptual state at the same time. And they can be very different. In some cases of perceptually guided actions (often when there is some optical illusions involved), some properties – say, size properties or spatial location properties – of the perceived object show up in our perceptual experience. But they are very different from the size or spatial direction properties that guide our fine-grained actions (as evidenced by, for example, the grip size with which we approach the object or the direction in which we reach) and of the two different size-properties, it is the experienced ones that are further from being veridical. The unconscious perceptual process tracks these properties more closely than the conscious perceptual experience (Goodale and Milner 2004, Goodale and Humphrey 1998, Króliczak et al. 2006). 
The representationalist has no problem accounting for such findings: the perceptual experience represents the object as having such and such size or spatial location properties, whereas the unconscious action-guiding perceptual state (in the dorsal visual subsystem) represents the object as having different size or spatial location properties. But it is difficult to see what the relationalist would say here, if they want to maintain that both perceptual experiences and unconscious mental states are relations to token objects. The token object we are looking at is the same for both states, and the size and spatial location properties of them are the same as well. How can we have these two very different relations to the very same token object (and the very same properties of this object) then? There is some logical space for maneuvering here (maybe by bringing in the third relatum), but not a lot. And, maybe as a result, few, if any, relationalists go down this path. Most relationalists opt to restrict the relationalist analysis to conscious perceptual experiences. Unconscious perception is dismissed either as not really perception or as something radically different from perceptual experience. 
This gives us a way of relating the two distinctions I talked about so far to each other: the distinction between taking perception to be perceptual processing and taking it to be perceptual phenomenology and the distinction between representationalism and relationalism. Relationalism, even if it doesn’t presuppose the perception as perceptual phenomenology attitude, at least makes that way of thinking about perception a natural one. Relationalists tend to be interested in perceptual phenomenology, not in perceptual processing. 
How about representationalists? Here we get more of a split. Many representationalists are very much interested in perceptual phenomenology, but representationalism is also a natural ally of the perception as perceptual processing approach as an important way of characterizing various stages of perceptual processing is in terms of the way they represent the perceived scene. One thing (most) representationalists seem to agree about is that as long as we allow that perceptual representations may be conscious or unconscious, whatever is special about perceptual representations is the common denominator between conscious and unconscious perception.​[1]​ Whether perception is conscious or unconscious leaves basic questions about the nature of perceptual representations untouched. 
Do we then get some alignment between representationalism and the perception as perceptual processing approach on the one hand and relationalism and the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach? I really don’t think so. Some relationalists have a lot to say about perceptual processing (see Campbell 2002, for example). And some representationalists explicitly talk about perceptual experiences – not perceptual states in general (including Adam Pautz’s representationalist contribution to this volume). But the representations they talk about are not specific to perceptual experiences. So we do not get two package deals, a relationalist perception as perceptual phenomenology approach and a representationalist perception as perceptual processing approach. 
But depending on which general explananda we consider, phenomenology or processing, the representationalism versus relationalism debate may play out very differently. As we have seen, the main explanandum of relationalism is perceptual phenomenology – some relationalists do talk about perceptual processing, but they tend to do so in order to elucidate perceptual phenomenology. And those representationalists who are interested in perceptual processing, maybe following the practice of cognitive science, use the concept of representation to make sense of perceptual phenomenology. For at least these representationalists, consciousness is not something that is the primary topic of philosophy of perception. For most relationalists, in contrast, philosophy of perception is all about consciousness. 
The 1980s recipe for naturalizing the mind was this: First we should understand how the mind represents the world and then once we are done with that, we can start explaining how some of these representations come to be conscious (Dretske 1988, Millikan 1984, Papineau 1990). This naturalistic approach chimes with the perception as perceptual processing approach and also with representationalism. And the 1990s obsession with consciousness chimes with the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach, although it should be acknowledged that it comes in both relationalist and representationalist flavors. 




I find it difficult to imagine how such compromise could be achieved without talking about perceptual content at least in some minimal sense. But then again, I am a representationalist. But even some (many?) relationalists would be happy to go along with the concept of perceptual content. I will now take advantage of the fact that Heather Logue’s relationalist contribution to this volume explicitly does so (not all on the relationalist side are so permissive). In any case, many of the current controversies in philosophy of perception are about perceptual content. Some of these may be rephrased in fully representation-free language, but I will not attempt to do so here. 
	What I take to be the most rudimentary way of thinking about perceptual content is this: perceptual states represent individuals as having properties. Or, to put it differently, perceptual states attribute properties to individuals. Or, to put it in a way that maybe even relationalists would accept, perceived properties are bound to perceived individuals perceptually. 
	Three questions arise immediately (and many more, further down the line): what are the properties that are attributed in perception? What are the individuals these properties are attributed to? And what is the format of these kinds of representations? I will address these questions in reverse order. 

IV. The structure of perceptual content 

The question is: how do perceptual states represent the world? The analogy often employed in this context is with the way beliefs represent the world. Beliefs also represent the world. So it would be tempting to describe the way perceptual states represent the world on the analogy of the way beliefs do so.
In the wake of the ‘linguistic turn’ of analytic philosophy, it became fashionable to talk about (some) mental states as propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are attitudes towards a proposition. Beliefs are paradigmatic examples: when we have a belief that it is raining outside, we have a belief attitude towards the proposition that it is raining outside. The content of this mental state, in other words, is a proposition: that it is raining outside. 
When it comes to perceptual content, it is tempting to reach for the same conceptual machinery of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are propositional attitudes, as are, the argument goes, hopes and desires. When we hope that it will be raining outside, we have a different kind of attitude – the hope attitude – towards the same proposition. Our hope has the same propositional content: that it is raining outside. And from here it is only a short step to extend this way of thinking about mental states to perceptual states. So the suggestion would be that when I see that it is raining outside, I have yet another kind of attitude, a seeing kind of attitude, towards the very same proposition: that it is raining outside. This would make perceptual content propositional and behave in general in a very similar way to the content of beliefs (Chalmers 2006, Matthen 2005). 
Proponents of this approach could and often would allow for some differences between perceptual content and the content of beliefs – perceptual content, for example, is said to have (necessarily) a demonstrative element embedded in the propositional content. But the way perceptual content is structured according to this view is exactly the way the content of beliefs is structured: propositionally. 
Those who want to resist this view would need to give a positive account of how perceptual content is structured, if not propositionally (a task made even more complicated by the various senses in which ‘propositional’ is used, see, e.g., Stalnaker 1976). And there are many ways of doing so: We can say that perceptual content is analog, whereas the content of beliefs is digital (Dretske 1981, but see also Dretske 1988). Or that what is distinctive about perceptual content is that it represents in a unit-free way (Peacocke 1986, p. 2, Peacocke 1989, p. 300). 
The general strategy for those who insist that perceptual content is non-propositional is to argue that perceptual content is not structured the way sentences are, but the way images are (Kulvicki 2015, Crane 2009). It is not easy to nail down what this means, but here is a standard way of doing so. Perceptual states attribute some set of properties to all points of the physical space in front of us (see Peacocke 1992, 2008 for one way of working out this idea). So, a photograph on your computer assigns a color to every pixel of the picture and perception assigns a shape, color and spatial location property to every point in the physical space in front of us, or, rather, to the closest non-transparent surface in every direction. 




One difference between beliefs and perceptual states is that while beliefs can represent pretty much any property, perceptual states can only represent a restricted set of properties. The big question is just how restricted this set is. 
I can have a belief that my laptop was produced by exploited workers for large profit, but when I’m looking at my computer, this is unlikely to be a property of the laptop that I attribute perceptually. So this is a property that is attributed to the laptop non-perceptually. The laptop’s shape property, in contrast, is, presumably, attributed perceptually. But then where to draw the line? This is the topic of the debate between Susanna Siegel and Alex Byrne in this volume. 
Much of the controversy in this area has centered on the following sorts of properties. It has been argued that we perceive objects as trees and tables (Siegel 2006a), as being causally efficacious (Siegel 2005, 2009), as edible, climbable or Q-able in general (Nanay 2011a, 2012a), as agents (Scholl and Tremoullet 2000), as having some kind of normative character or value (Kelly 2010, Matthen 2010), as having dispositional properties (Nanay 2011b), and as having moral value (Kriegel 2007). 
In light of the discussion above, we can identify an ambiguity in this debate. Depending on whether we are interested in perceptual processing or perceptual phenomenology, we get two very different disputes. We can ask what properties show up in our perceptual phenomenology – what properties are represented, consciously, in perceptual experiences. Or we can ask what properties the (not necessarily conscious) representations in the perceptual system represent. And the answer is likely to be very different (see Nanay 2012a and 2012b on this disambiguation). Not all properties that (unconscious) representations in the perceptual system attribute will show up in our perceptual phenomenology. 
	When it comes to the debate about perceptual phenomenology, most arguments for and against the claims that such and such a property is part of our perceptual phenomenology are based on what has been called the methodology of contrast cases (see Masrour 2011, Siewert 2002, Siegel 2007, Kriegel 2007 and Bayne 2009). It works like this: if we find two token experiences that only differ in that property P shows up in one but not the other and if the two experiences differ in their perceptual phenomenology, then property P is part of our perceptual phenomenology. 
	The problem with the contrast case methodology is that it is difficult to settle disagreements about phenomenology. If I say that two experiences differ in their perceptual phenomenology and you deny this, it is not clear how the issue can be decided. Intuitions wildly differ with regards to which aspects of phenomenal character count as perceptual. Suppose that you learn that the meat you’re eating is rat meat. Your overall phenomenology, supposedly, changes. But does your perceptual phenomenology change? If someone were to claim that it is their non-perceptual phenomenology that changes, it is difficult to see how we could settle this disagreement. 
	I do not mean to suggest that the question about what properties show up in our perceptual phenomenology is intractable – there may be ways of strengthening the methodology of contrast cases, and there may also be other ways (besides introspection) of finding out about perceptual phenomenology (see Bayne 2009, Nanay 2012b, Block 2014). 
But when it comes to the debate about what kind of properties representations in the perceptual system represent objects as having, the methodology is more straightforward. If we can’t explain, say, the fine-grained motor output caused directly by a perceptual state without positing a perceptual representation that represents a certain kind of property (say, the property of the location in one’s egocentric space), then we have good reason to conclude that this kind of property is perceived (in the sense of represented in perceptual processing (not necessarily consciously)). I give some examples of how this would work in Nanay 2013. 

VI. Attention and perception

I have been focusing on just one issue concerning perceived properties: namely, the range of these properties: are they shape properties, color properties, sortal properties? But there are other questions we can ask about perceptually attributed properties. 
	First, suppose we identified the kinds of properties we perceptually represent objects as having. What are these properties exactly? What is their ontology? For example, are they tropes or universals? Two different token entities can have the very same property if we think of properties as universals. But they are logically incapable of having the same property if we think of properties as tropes (see Campbell 1990). Without getting lost in the metaphysical intricacies of this distinction, it can be pointed out that representing an object as having a universal is a very different mental state from representing an object as having a trope (Mulligan et al. 1984). The question is: do perceptual states represent tropes or universals? If we think of properties as tropes, then this nudges an account of perceptual content towards some sort of compromise between representationalism and relationalism – as seeing two different but indistinguishable objects would amount to being in two very different perceptual states that attribute very different tropes to these objects (Nanay 2012c). 
	Second, properties can be of varying degrees of determinacy. Take color properties. Being red is more determinate than being colored, but it is less determinate than being scarlet. This gives us a nice ordering of property-types in terms of their determinacy. The question then is: do perceptual states represent more determinate or less determinate (that is, more determinable) properties? 
	It may be tempting to say that perceptual states represent more determinate properties (or maybe even superdeterminate properties, which means determinates without further determinates, see Funkhouser 2006) and maybe contrast perceptual states with beliefs that can only represent less determinate properties. A picture is worth a thousand words, as they say: when I see an apple, I see the exact (superdeterminate) shade of red that it has. But when I form a belief about an apple (maybe because you told me it was red), I can only represent it in a much less determinate way (as red, and not as having the exact shade of color it has) – so the argument would go. 
We should resist arguments of this kind (see also Dennett 1996) as we know that many of the properties we perceive (for example in the periphery of our visual field) are not at all determinate. In other words, perceptual states attribute properties of varying degree of determinacy. And given that perceptual content is the sum total of perceptually attributed properties (structured in some way), the degree of determinacy of perceptually attributed properties is part of what determines perceptual content. 
But then whatever the degree of determinacy of the perceptually attributed properties depends on is also part of what determines perceptual content. And one plausible candidate for what the degree of determinacy of the perceptually attributed properties depends on is attention. The general idea is that attending to a property makes, or tries to make, this property more determinate (Nanay 2010, Stazicker 2011, see also Yeshurun and Carrasco 1998 for empirical support). But if this is so, then we can never specify the content of a perceptual state without specifying perceptual attention.
This leads to a very specific view about the relation between attention and perception. Attention is an absolutely necessary feature of perception: perception is the perceptual attribution of properties of varying determinacy and it is (partly) attention that fixes how determinate these attributed properties are (which ones are more determinate, which ones are less determinate). In other words, attention is part of perception (see Bob Kentridge and Berit Brogaard’s paper in this volume, but see also Wayne Wu’s contribution for discussion). 
The alternative of this view is that attention is something post-perceptual. You see something and then you can attend to various features of what you see. But the way you attend does not alter your perception itself. 
Clearly which view one accepts depends not just on how one thinks about perception but also on how one thinks about attention. If attention is taken to be the act of attending, then the post-perceptual view seems more appealing. And while some acknowledge that the act of attending can be unconscious and that it does not have to be done deliberately (attention can be captured in a non-deliberate manner, but it is still, according to this approach, normally conscious), this way of thinking about attention has some important commonalities with the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach. What evidence can we have for the deployment of attention? Mainly introspective (again, maybe allowing for fringe cases like unconscious attention). 
But we can also think of attention as an important aspect of perceptual processing that partly determines perceptual content. As perceptual content does not have to be conscious, there is no reason to hold that attention would need to be conscious, or even that it would be typically conscious. And if we think of attention this way, then the way to find out more about it is to look at empirical findings, both neuro-imaging and behavioral results, which could help us find out how attention influences perceptual processing (and it seems that there is very strong evidence that attention modulates already very early perceptual processing with its influence getting more diverse as perceptual processing unfolds (Gandhi et al. 1999, O’Connor et al. 2002). 
If there is a certain amount of miscommunication in philosophy of perception in taking perception either to be perceptual processing or perceptual phenomenology, there is even more miscommunication along these lines in the philosophy of attention. And here, just as in philosophy of perception, the prospects for some kind of reconciliation are not completely hopeless. If you think of attention as part of perceptual processing and as something that partly determines perceptual content, you have a straightforward way of explaining something important about perceptual phenomenology, namely, that attention has a major influence on perceptual phenomenology (as the inattentional blindness experiments show nicely, see Mach and Rock 1999 for a summary). 




I talked a lot about which properties are attributed perceptually. But what are these properties, whatever they may be, perceptually attributed to? What are the entities we perceptually represent as having these properties? The first thing to note is that they may not be entities per se, but rather events: much of what we perceive are events, not unchanging entities. I will use the general term ‘sensory individual’ to refer to the individual (event or entity) that perceptual states attribute properties to perceptually (see Cohen 2004). 
	We have seen that there is a difference between the range of properties perceptually represented and the range of properties represented (perceptually or not perceptually). The property of being made by exploited workers for large profit can be represented (and attributed to my laptop) but it is unlikely to be perceptually represented (that is, perceptually attributed to my laptop). And similarly, we need to make the same distinction between the individuals we attribute properties to perceptually and the entities we attribute properties to (perceptually or not perceptually). The two may not be the same. And I call the former, the individuals we attribute properties to perceptually, ‘sensory individuals’. 
	And here, again, we get some discrepancies about what methodology we should use when we are trying to figure out what the sensory individuals of perception are. Philosophers often use introspection (and, sometimes even linguistic considerations about how we talk about what we see or what we hear) to figure out what sensory individuals are. But this way of going about the problem arguably presupposes the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach. 
Further, this is a somewhat dubious strategy, not only if we allow for unconscious perception, where we are extremely unlikely to stumble upon the correct sensory individual either by introspecting or by ordinary language analysis. It is a dubious strategy even for conscious perception: it is, as we have seen, very difficult to tell perceptual and non-perceptual phenomenology apart on the basis of introspection only. Introspection delivers some kind of individuals that we take to be attributing properties to perceptually. But of course the question of sensory individuals is not a question of what we take ourselves to perceive. 
The alternative, again, would be to see how the perceptual system binds properties to individuals and zero in on the individuals the perceptual system binds properties to. If we have reason to postulate an (unconscious) perceptual representation, presumably, to explain the fine-grained behavior of agents, and if this perceptual representation attributes properties to a certain kind of individual, we have good reason to conclude that this individual is the (or, rather, a) sensory individual of perception. But I will not pretend that this approach solves all the problems about sensory individuals, as we shall see in the next section.

VIII. Differences between sense modalities

To make the question of sensory individuals even more complicated, it seems that sensory individuals may vary across sense modalities. The main contenders for sensory individuals in vision are ordinary objects and spatiotemporal regions (Clark 2000, 2004, Matthen 2004, Cohne 2004). The main contenders for sensory individuals in audition are sounds and ordinary objects (Kulvicki 2008, Nudds 2001, 2010, O’Callaghan 2007, Pasnau 1999, Matthen 2010, Casati and Dokic 1994, Nudds and O’Callaghan 2009). And for olfaction, they are odors and ordinary objects (Lycan 2000, Batty 2010, 2011). Do we hear the sound of the coffee machine or the coffee machine itself? Or do we hear one by hearing the other? 
	These are as current and as controversial questions as current controversies in the philosophy of perception get. But they also point in a more general direction where there has been a lot of new work in philosophy of perception: on the similarities and especially differences between different sense modalities. 
	Most philosophers of perception write about vision. And even when they write about perception in general, they tend to use visual examples. I say ‘they’, but really, I should write ‘we’ – almost all the examples in this piece so far were visual examples. And a new and very commendable trend in philosophy of perception is to examine how much we can generalize from the visual sense modality to non-visual sense modalities (see Clark 2011 for a summary). 
	The question of sensory individuals is one of the fields where any such generalization seems like a very bad idea. Even if we manage to settle whether the sensory individuals of vision are ordinary objects or spatiotemporal regions, this says nothing about the possibility of sounds as auditory sensory individuals or the possibility of odors as olfactory sensory individuals. 
	But there are other important questions where acknowledging and examining the differences between different sense modalities can help us to make progress. One of these is the perception of space. Vision seems to represent space, but it is very controversial whether audition or olfaction does so. Olfaction doesn’t even seem to localize its sensory individual, whatever that may be, in space (see the discussion in Matthew Nudds’ contribution to this volume). And we get similar dissimilarities when it comes to the perception of time or of durations – again, audition just seems very different in this respect from vision. 
	It is important to emphasize that this new research direction of taking the non-visual sense modalities seriously does not accept it as a dogma that different sense modalities are just different. In fact, it has been argued that we can restore at least some degree of similarity between, say, vision and audition, as long as we find the right way to think about sounds (see, for example, John Kulvicki’s contribution to this volume). But any such argument about the similarity between some features of different sense modalities would need to be based on a thorough analysis of the two different sense modalities. 
	As a result, philosophy of perception has become more fragmented, but in a good way. Rather than looking for some very general features of perception per se, more and more philosophers of perception are working on one specific sense modality and the odd quirks this sense modality may have that other sense modalities may not have. And I also have the probably quite naïve hope that this narrowing down of the explanandum may help the reconciliation between the perception as perceptual phenomenology and the perception as perceptual processing approach (partly because if one works on, say, the specificities of olfaction, it is difficult to ignore the (empirical) details of how olfactory information gets processed and rely on introspection only). 

IX. The multimodality of perception

All of the preceding discussion of the differences and similarities between different sense modalities seems to presuppose that perceptual processing in one sense modality is independent from perceptual processing in another sense modality. But this is blatantly not so. One of the major boom areas of philosophy of perception is the study of the multimodal nature of perception – the study of the intricate connections between different sense modalities, which starts at very early stages of perceptual processing (O’Callaghan 2008, Vroomen et al. 2001, Spence and Driver 2004, Shams et al. 2000, Watkins et al. 2006). 
	As revealed in the language I used in the previous paragraph, it is easier to talk about the multimodality of perception within the perception as perceptual processing approach. In fact, it is not clear how the perception as perceptual phenomenology can fully engage with the findings on multimodality without engaging with the perception as perceptual processing approach. 
What happens in, say, the auditory sense modality is influenced by the, say, visual sense modality (a striking example is ventriloquism, where our auditory experience, where we hear the voice coming from, is influenced by the visual information about the ventriloquist’s and the dummy’s mouth, see Bertelson 1999). And this goes for perceptual experience, not just perceptual processing. So the auditory experience changes, but it changes as a result of some important changes in the visual perceptual processing – the very idea of cross-modal effects presupposes the talk of perceptual processes (as regardless of whether these effects influence processing or experience, what causes these effects is not an experience, but perceptual processing in another sense modality).​[2]​ 
Leaving the perception as perceptual processing versus perception as perceptual phenomenology big picture discussion aside, one important question about the multimodality of perception is just how radically these findings could or should transform philosophy of perception as we know it. One old question about philosophy of perception is about the individuation of the senses – what makes seeing different from hearing, for example. Do the new findings about the intricate connections between sense modalities make this debate obsolete? Does it make sense to bother with what makes different sense modalities different in a multimodal philosophy of perception? 
Further, to return to the issue of sensory individuals once more, when I presented the debates about what sensory individuals are in different sense modalities, I was implicitly assuming, with the rest of that literature, that vision has its sensory individuals, which may or may not be different from the sensory individuals of, say, audition. But given the multimodality of perception one may wonder how these sensory individuals are related to one another. 
Most of what we perceive we perceive with more than one sense modality. I call individuals that can be perceived with more than one sense modalities, with great terminological innovation, multisensory individuals. Note the difference between the term ‘multisensory’ and ‘multimodal’, as I use them. Multisensory merely means something we can perceive by two or more sense modalities. Multimodality has to do with the interaction of these senses – something not at all presupposed by the concept of multisensory.
So the question is this: what happens when we perceive multisensory individuals? This is not an arcane question. Most of what we perceive are multisensory individuals. In fact, it is quite difficult to think of sensory individuals that are not multisensory individuals in this sense. People are multisensory individuals – we can see them, hear them, smell them, touch them, maybe taste them too. And the same goes for most of the objects and events around us. But there may be some sensory individuals that are not multisensory individuals. Rainbows, for example, arguably, are not multisensory individuals – we can perceive them visually only. 
But then it is tempting to think of multisensory individuals as multimodal sensory individuals. When we perceive multisensory individuals (like people), we encounter not two different sensory individuals in two different sense modalities that happen to coincide. Rather, we encounter one mereologically complex multimodal sensory individual. We attribute visual properties to the visual part of this mereologically complex multimodal sensory individual and we attribute auditory properties to its auditory part (see Casey O’Callaghan’s and Mohan Matthen’s contribution to this volume). 
Do we need to represent both parts of this complex multimodal sensory individual simultaneously in audition and in vision? Not necessarily – maybe our attention alternates between the auditory and the visual parts (Spence and Bayne 2014). It is also unclear just how mereologically complex this multimodal sensory individual is – in the case of perceiving people, the multimodal sensory individual has at least visual and auditory parts, but maybe even an olfactory one? And what makes some sensory individuals, like rainbows, unimodal? Does it have to do with our previous encounters (uni- or multimodal) with individuals of that kind? The answers to these questions are not clear. But taking the multimodality of perception seriously changes the questions we ask about perception. 
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^1	  Those who take perceptual states to have ‘phenomenal intentionality’ would disagree here. 
^2	  The multimodality of perception, more specifically, the phenomenon of crossmodal binding  (Vroomen et al. 2001, Bertelson and de Gelder 2004), spells even more specific trouble for the natural ally of the perception as perceptual phenomenology approach, namely, relationalism (see Nanay 2014).
